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Firm Growth and Efficiency in the Banking Industry:  
A New Test of the Efficient Structure Hypothesis  
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper proposes a new test of the efficient structure hypothesis by directly examining the 
relation between firm efficiency and firm growth.  This is also a test of the so-called quiet-life 
hypothesis.  Applying this test to large banks in Japan, we find that more efficient banks become 
larger, which is consistent with the efficient structure hypothesis.  We also find that market 
concentration reduces banks’ cost efficiency, which is consistent with the quiet-life hypothesis.  
These findings imply that there is an intriguing growth-efficiency dynamic throughout the life cycle 
of banks, although yet another finding suggests that the economic impact of the quiet-life 
hypothesis is less significant than that of the efficient structure hypothesis. 
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1. Introduction 
As proposed by Demsetz (1973), the efficient structure hypothesis (hereafter the ES 
hypothesis) predicts that under the pressure of market competition, efficient firms win the 
competition and grow, so that they become larger, obtain greater market share, and earn higher 
profits.  As a result, the market becomes more concentrated.  Under this hypothesis, a market 
becomes more efficient as it becomes more concentrated, so that anti-concentration measures 
cause unnecessary distortion in the economy.  
This implication of the ES hypothesis is in sharp contrast with that of the 
structure-conduct-performance hypothesis (hereafter the SCP hypothesis).  The SCP 
hypothesis predicts that a concentrated market engenders a low degree of competition, leading 
to market inefficiency, e.g., monopolistic pricing and excess (monopoly) profits.  Similar to the 
ES hypothesis, the SCP hypothesis also predicts a positive relation between concentration and 
profits, but through a completely different mechanism.  This hypothesis does call for 
anti-concentration measures. 
Partly due to these contrasting predictions, the ES hypothesis has been “tested” in earlier 
empirical studies in the context of a test of the SCP hypothesis.  As per the standard test of the 
SCP hypothesis, these studies regress a market performance variable (e.g., the market price or 
firm profitability) on a market structure variable (e.g., a measure of market concentration).  
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However, they add market share as an additional independent variable, and if market share has 
a has a positive effect, they view this as support for the EP hypothesis (see e.g., Weiss 1974 and 
Smirlock 1985).  There are serious shortcomings to this approach.  First, it is widely 
recognized that we cannot infer causal relationships from analyses of this type (see e.g., Tirole 
1988, p.1-2).  Second, market share is not good measures of firm efficiency.  Third, in these 
papers the ES and the SCP hypotheses are tested as alternatives to each other, but in theory 
they might be compatible, at least in the short-run. 
To resolve these shortcomings in the literature, Berger (1995) proposes to regress firm 
profitability on a direct measure of firm efficiency.  To augment this regression analysis, 
Berger (1995) also suggests that additional regressions should be run in which a market 
concentration measure and market shares are modeled as functions of the efficiency measure.  
Although a direct focus on efficiency is the main contribution of this test, we argue that it still 
suffers from shortcomings, because the ES hypothesis has no clear predictions for the 
relationship between market performance and firm efficiency.   
In this paper, we propose a new test of the ES hypothesis, which focuses on a core 
proposition of the hypothesis; that is, efficient firms win the competition and grow.  In this 
test, we directly regress a measure of firm growth on a measure of firm efficiency, and examine 
whether the efficiency contributes to firm growth.  Our test is more direct, and thus more 
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fundamental, than existing tests of the ES hypothesis.1 
Although our primary focus is to test the ES hypothesis with a regression model of firm 
growth, we also take into account the determination of firm efficiency by simultaneously 
estimating an equation with the efficiency measure as the dependent variable.  The direct 
merit of this simultaneous estimation is an increase in the efficiency of estimation, but this also 
allows us to test the so-called quiet-life hypothesis, which is closely related to the SCP 
hypothesis.   
The quiet-life hypothesis suggests that in a concentrated market firms do not minimize costs, 
because of insufficient managerial effort, lack of profit-maximizing behavior, wasteful 
expenditures to obtain and maintain monopoly power, and/or survival of inefficient managers 
(Berger and Hannan 1998).  To test this hypothesis, we examine in our efficiency regression 
whether firms in a more concentrated market are more inefficient.  Although the ES 
hypothesis and the quiet-life hypothesis have conflicting implications, their effects might 
co-exist, at least in the short-run.  We thus test the two hypotheses by simultaneous estimation 
of the growth equation and the efficiency equation.   
Applying this test to banks in Japan, we find that more efficient banks tend to become larger.  
                                                  
1 Altough the ES hypothesis also predicts that the growth of efficient firms makes the market more 
concentrated, we do not focus on this growth-concentration nexus.  This is because, although the 
market might ultimately be concentrated with a small number of efficient firms in a steady state, the 
relationship between firm growth and market concentration is unclear before reaching the steady 
state.  For example, as large inefficient firms lose market share, the market becomes temporarily 
less concentrated. 
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This finding supports the ES hypothesis.  However, we also find that banks in a more 
concentrated market are more inefficient, which is consistent with the quiet-life hypothesis.  
On balance, our findings imply that efficiency allows firms to survive competition and to grow, 
but the resulting market concentration then erodes firm efficiency.  The finding that both the 
ES hypothesis and the quiet-life hypothesis are supported is, to our knowledge, the first of its 
kind.  We also find that the economic impact of the ES hypothesis is more significant than that 
of the ES hypothesis.  This implies that anti-concentration measures might increase 
inefficiency in the economy.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section, we review related literature 
and explain our contribution.  Section 3 explains our methodology.  We apply the 
methodology to banks in Japan in section 4.  The final section concludes.   
 
2. Literature 
2.1. Efficient structure hypothesis 
Earlier studies have tested the ES hypothesis (and the SCP hypothesis) by regressing firm 
profit on market shares, as well as on a measure of market concentration, e.g., market 
Hirfindahl (e.g., Weiss 1974 and Smirlock 1985).  These studies argue that market share is a 
proxy for relative efficiency of the firms, and that the ES hypothesis is supported if the share has 
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a positive effect on profit.  In these studies, the SCP hypothesis is thought to be supported if 
market concentration has a positive effect on profit.2   
However, it is unclear whether the two hypotheses are actually supported by such findings.  
Market shares, the squared sum of which is the Hirfindahl index, also reflects market power of 
the firm, and so it might support the SCP hypothesis if market share has a positive impact on 
profit.3  Smirlock (1985) additionally uses an interaction term between market concentration 
and market shares to separately identify the two hypotheses, but the reasoning behind this 
identification is again unclear.   
Investigating the concentration-profit relationship is also problematic.  Much as in the 
standard test of the SCP hypothesis, the tests of the two hypotheses detailed above cannot 
identify a causal relationship (see e.g., Tirole 1988, p.1-2).  Also, both the ES hypothesis and 
the SCP hypothesis imply a positive relationship between concentration and profits, although 
the underlying mechanisms are totally different.  Thus, in theory the test explained above 
cannot differentiate between these hypotheses.  
To overcome these problems, Berger and Hannan (1989) propose an alternative test, which 
                                                  
2 More recent studies along these lines include Evanoff and Fortier (1988), who take into account 
entry barriers; Tregenna (2009), who uses panel data from the pre-crisis period in the U.S.; Hsieh 
and Lee (2010), who allow the effect of market concentration to vary depending on the factors such 
as foreign or government bank ownership, law and regulation, corporate governance, economic 
development, and intra-industry competition; and Goddard et al. (2010) the main focus of which is 
profit convergence, with the hypotheses in this paper relegated to secondary importance. 
3 See Shepherd (1986).  Smirlock, Gilligan, and Marshall (1984) disagree with the idea that market 
share does not necessarily reflect market power, but this is mere speculation on their part. 
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investigates the price-concentration relationship.  Their argument for the identification is the 
following:  On one hand, the SCP hypothesis predicts that in a more concentrated market 
where firms have more monopoly power, the market price is higher.  On the other hand, the 
ES hypothesis predicts that in a more concentrated market where efficient firms dominate, the 
market price is lower.  Using data on U.S. deposit markets, Berger and Hannan (1989) find a 
lower interest rate (i.e., a higher price) in a more concentrated market - a finding, they argue, 
which is consistent with the SCP hypothesis. 
However, the test in Berger and Hannan (1989) still suffers from a serious drawback; the 
prediction of the ES hypothesis with respect to the price-concentration relationship is unclear.4  
Berger and Hannan (1989) argue that efficient firms would set a lower price in order to compete 
with their rivals.  However, as Demsetz (1973) originally articulated, superior competitive 
performance might be unique to the efficient firms and unobtainable to others, and so efficient 
firms might set a higher price and enjoy more monopoly profits, at least in the short-run.  
Similar criticism might also hold when profits, rather than a price, is used as a dependent 
variable; in this case, the predictions are further complicated because we need to take into 
account the differences in firms’ cost levels. 
Berger (1995) proposes an alternative and (in our opinion) better approach.  Because the 
                                                  
4 Another problem is that the price equation should have independent variables to control for both 
supply and demand factors.  Brewer and Jackson (2006) deal with this issue. 
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ES hypothesis concerns firm efficiency, the hypothesis is better tested by explicitly taking it into 
account; Berger (1995) proposes to use a measure of cost efficiency as the main explanatory 
variable in a regression model of firm profitability.  Furthermore, he also proposes to run 
regressions of market concentration and market shares as a function of the cost efficiency 
measure, because, as he argues, the ES hypothesis is supported only if the efficiency measure 
has positive coefficients in all the three regressions (i.e., on profitability, market concentration, 
and market share).5   
This test of Berger (1995) is in a sense more direct than the previous tests, because it 
includes a measure of firm efficiency.  However, its use of firm profitability on the left-hand 
side of the main regression is still problematic.  As explained above, the implications of the ES 
hypothesis for firm profitability are unclear.  Also, there is inconsistency between the 
predictions in Berger and Hannan (1989) and in Berger (1995).  The former predicts a lower 
price for more efficient firms, but the latter predicts higher profits for them.  These predictions 
are mutually compatible only if the costs of the efficient firms are far smaller than those of less 
efficient firms.  Finally, Berger (1995) treats the efficiency measure as an exogenous variable, 
but it is more plausible to assume that an efficiency level is endogenously determined, as we 
assume in our test below. 
                                                  
5 Park and Weber (2006) apply this methodology to Korean banks.  Al-Muharrami and Matthews 
(2009) consider four different approaches that include the tests of Berger and Hannan (1989) and of 
Berger (1995) as special cases. 
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As explained below, we propose a test of the ES hypothesis that focuses on a more 
fundamental prediction of the hypothesis – i.e., that efficient firms win competition and grow.  
Similar to Berger (1995), we also propose to use a measure of cost efficiency; however, we use it 
to explain firm growth.   
 
2.2. Other related studies 
In addition to a regression testing the ES hypothesis, we simultaneously estimate an 
equation with firm efficiency on the left-hand side.  This not only increases the efficiency of 
our estimation, but also enables us to examine the effect of market structure on firm efficiency.  
Regarding the market structure-firm efficiency nexus, Berger and Hannan (1998) predict that 
market structure might negatively impact cost efficiency, because in a concentrated market 
firms do not minimize costs.  They find support for this quiet-life hypothesis when they regress 
a measure of bank efficiency on a measure of market concentration (the Hirfindahl index).  
Berger and Hannan (1998) recognize that there might be a causal relationship from efficiency to 
competition, but they only examine the quiet-life hypothesis (after controlling for reverse 
causality using instrumental variables). 
More recent studies focus on the relationship between market power and firm efficiency, 
employing elaborate methodologies using various market power measures (e.g., Maudos and de 
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Guevara 2007, Turk Ariss 2010 , Schaeck and Chihak 2010, Färe et al. 2011, and Koetter et al. 
2012).  However, these studies are only interested in the impact of market power on firm 
efficiency, and do not test the ES hypothesis. 
There are some studies that are methodologically similar to ours.  One investigates the 
co-existence of the market-power hypothesis and the ES hypothesis using a VAR model (Jeon 
and Miller 2005).  However, they use a bivariate VAR model and only examine the relation 
between a market performance measure and a concentration measure.  Casu and Girardone 
(2009) estimate a similar autoregressive model that is composed of competition variables 
(Lerner index) and efficiency variables (cost efficiency measures).  However, the two 
regressions are separately estimated, with no control variables.   
Finally, because we examine the effect of firm efficiency on firm growth, this paper is related 
to the literature on firm growth.  Goddard, McKillop, and Wilson (2002) test the laws of 
proportionate effect, which are based on an idea of Gibrat (1931) that firms grow stochastically 
and so every industry sooner or later exhibits concentration.6   It is, however, hard to believe 
that firm growth is a purely stochastic phenomenon.  It is more likely that growth is 
determined by some economic factors (which might themselves be stochastic).  In our 
investigation of the ES hypothesis, we focus on firm efficiency as one such factor.  
                                                  
6 Goddard, Molyneux, and Wilson (2004) extend this analysis and examine the simultaneous 
determination of firm growth and profitability. 
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 3. Methodology 
3.1. Test of ES hypothesis  
Our test directly investigates the effect of firm efficiency on firm growth.  The main 
regression takes the following form: 
, 1 , 1 2 ,i t i i t i t i tGROWTH EF X ,       ,   (1) 
where the indices i and t respectively represent the firm and the time.  The dependent variable 
is a proxy for firm growth.  When we apply this test to banks in Japan in the following section, 
we use the amount and the growth of loans or assets as the firm growth proxy.  The term 
, 1i tEF   is the measure for firm efficiency.  This specification assumes that the effect of 
efficiency is realized with a one-year lag.  A vector of independent variables ,i tX  consists of 
control variables such as economic conditions and/or firm heterogeneity.  The final term ,i t  
is an ordinary error term.  We test the ES hypothesis by examining whether the coefficient for 
, 1i tEF   ( 1 ) is positive and significant, because the hypothesis predicts that efficient firms grow.   
There are several approaches to estimate , 1i tEF  .  They are broadly classified into 
parametric and non-parametric approaches.7  However, little consensus has been reached with 
respect to which is the best measure.  The choice among several approaches also depends on 
                                                  
7 See for example, Schmidt (1985) and Bauer (1990).  Berger and Humphrey (1997) survey 
methodologies used to estimate bank efficiency.  Berger (2007) compares international evidence on 
bank efficiency.  
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the characteristics of the data used.  As explained below, in our application of this test to banks 
in Japan, we adopt a parametric distribution-free approach that also takes into account 
time-varying fixed effects.   
 
3.2. Test of quiet-life hypothesis  
To increase the efficiency of our estimation and to test the quiet-life hypothesis, we run a 
regression with firm efficiency on the left-hand side: 
, 1 1 2 ,i t i t i t i tEF CONC Z ,      .   (2) 
The dependent variable is the measure of firm efficiency, ,i tZ  is a vector of control variables, 
and ,i t  is an ordinary error term.   
The main independent variable is 1tCONC  , a measure for market concentration such as the 
market Hirfindahl or the three-firm concentration ratio.  The quiet-life hypothesis predicts 
that there is a positive relationship between market concentration and firm inefficiency, 
because of insufficient managerial effort, lack of profit-maximization behavior, wasteful 
expenditures to obtain and maintain monopoly power, and/or survival of inefficient managers, 
in a more concentrated market (Berger and Hannan 1998).  In our test, a negative and 
significant coefficient for 1  is consistent with this hypothesis.   
We simultaneously estimate the regressions (1) and (2).  From an econometric viewpoint, 
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this has the benefit of increasing the efficiency of estimation.  However, the simultaneous 
estimation has also gives us important economic insight.  Most of the existing empirical 
studies presume that the ES hypothesis and the SCP hypothesis are alternatives.  In actuality, 
however, both mechanisms might work simultaneously, at least in the short-run.  Our 
approach allows for the two hypotheses to be supported at the same time, which is the case 
when we find 1  to be positive and 1  to be negative. 
 
4. Application to Japanese banks 
4.1. Data  
Applying the methodology explained in the previous section, we now test the two hypotheses 
using bank data from Japan from the 1974-2005 period (fiscal years).8  Unless otherwise 
specified, the data used are from banks’ financial statements (unconsolidated base) compiled in 
the Nikkei NEEDS Company (Bank) Data File CD-ROM (Nikkei Media Marketing, Inc.).   
Banks in Japan are classified into several types.9  We chose to examine city banks and 
long-term credit banks that operate in a single nationwide market.10  We excluded trust banks 
because they are not ordinary banks, in that they provide trust services.  We excluded other 
                                                  
8 Fiscal years in Japan start in April and end in the following March.  The duration of the sample 
period shortens in some analysis when we use lagged variables. 
9 See Uchida and Udell (2010) for more information about different types of banks in Japan. 
10 City banks are the largest banks and have nationwide branch networks, and long-term credit 
banks are those legally designated to focus on long-term banking.  There used to be three 
long-term credit banks in Japan, but all of them changed their status to ordinary banks by 2004. 
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smaller banks because they all operate regionally, mainly targeting small- or medium-sized 
enterprises in the region, and so their markets are segmented from those in our sample.  
The banking industry in Japan has experienced a wave of drastic consolidation since the late 
1990s, and in this period many banks in our sample merged with each other and changed their 
names.  Banks grow when a merger takes place, because the new bank is larger in size than 
each of its predecessors.  However, our focus is on growth due to efficiency, and not on growth 
due to consolidation.  Thus, when new banks emerge due to consolidation, we treat the new 
banks and their predecessors as different entities.  As a result, we have 26 banks in our 
sample.11   
 
4.2. Main regressions 
This subsection explains how we specify the two regressions explained in section 3.  The 
descriptive statistics for the variables used below are shown in Table 1. 
<<Insert Table 1 about here>> 
 
                                                  
11 The 26 banks are: Industrial Bank of Japan, Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, Nippon Credit 
Bank, Shinsei Bank, Aozora Bank, Daiichi Kangyo Bank, Mizuho Bank, Mitsui Bank, Saskura Bank, 
Fuji Bank, Mizuho Corporate Bank, Mitsubishi Bank, Tokyo Mitubishi Bank, Kyowa Bank, Asahi 
Bank, Sanwa Bank, UFJ Bank, Sumitomo Bank, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, Daiwa 
Bank, Resona Bank, Tokai Bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Taiyo Kobe Bank, Bank of Tokyo, and 
Saitama Bank.  Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ is excluded because we have only one observation 
for them in our sample period. 
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4.2.1. ES equation 
For the ES hypothesis, we use two alternative specifications for equation (1): 
,ln i tL 0 1 , 1 2 3 4 , 5ln ,
L
i t t t i t t i tEF GDP rc CR INFL                
,
, (3) 
or 
, 0 1 , 1 2 3 4 , 5ln ln
L
i t i t t t i t t i tL EF GDP rc CR INFL                  . (3’) 
The variable  is the amount of loans outstanding (in real terms).  We focus on bank 
growth in the lending market, because loans are one of the key products of a bank.
,i tL
12  The key 
independent variable , 1i tEF   is a measure of banks’ cost efficiency.  Equations (3) and (3’) are 
alternatives that differ in terms of how they measure bank growth.  Equation (3) is a level 
equation that focuses on the effect of , 1i tEF   on the level of .  Equation (3’) is a difference 
equation that focuses on the change (difference) in  from the previous period.  In either 
version, the ES hypothesis is supported if we find that 
,i tL
,i tL
1  is positive.  
To estimate the efficiency measure, , 1i tEF  , we follow an approach using bank fixed effects.  
This approach estimates a cost function and obtains an efficiency measure as a bank 
fixed-effect.13  We first obtain a cost inefficiency measure as the difference between the banks’ 
actual costs and the cost of the most efficient bank on the efficient frontier (i.e., the difference 
between the levels of the individual bank fixed-effects and the minimum bank fixed-effect).  In 
                                                  
12 In a robustness check in subsection 4.4, we focus on growth in bank assets. 
13 See Schmidt and Sickels (1984) and Schmidt (1985) for this approach.  For other approaches, 
see Bauer (1990).  
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doing so, we interact the fixed-effect terms with the time trend variable and its square and cube 
terms, and thereby estimate a time-varying efficiency measure.14  We then define our measure 
of cost efficiency by reversing the sign of the inefficiency measure and taking the exponential.  
The details of the derivation for the cost efficiency measure, including the estimation of the cost 
function, are elaborated in the Appendix.  Note that this efficiency estimation of ours has two 
notable advantages: First, compared with stochastic-frontier approaches, our estimation is 
distribution-free.  Second, our efficiency measure is flexible in the sense that it is time-varying.  
Turning now to our other explanatory variables, because we use the amount of loans as the 
dependent variable, we control for loan supply and loan demand.  We use , real GDP, as 
a measure of demand.  For supply variables, we use , the call rate, which is an interest rate 
for the most representative interbank market in Japan, and , the capital-asset ratio.  
Finally, we use 
tGDP
trc
,i tCR
tINFL , the inflation rate defined as the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  
This variable might capture a demand as well as a supply factor.  In equation (3’) we take first 
differences of these variables.15 
 
                                                  
trc
,i tCR
14 This is the approach of Cornwell et al. (1990), but they do not use the cubic term.   
15 Due to data availability,  is the interest rate for secured overnight lending before 1985 and for 
unsecured overnight lending after 1985.   is the Basel capital ratio if available, and is 1 – 
leverage if otherwise.  The data sources are the SNA from the Cabinet Office and the Financial and 
Economic Statistics Monthly from the Bank of Japan.  
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4.2.2. Quiet-life equation 
For equation (2), the quiet-life hypothesis equation, we use the following two alternative 
specifications: 
,i tEF 1 1tHI   2 3 4 5SMLBANK MEDBANK LARBANK HUGBANKD D D D            
6 7 8MERGER LTCB FHCD D D        9 iAGE   
10 , 11 ,i t i tLA DA     12 iSDROA  ,Ui t .   (4) 
or 
,i tEF 1 1tHI   2 3 4 5SMLBANK MEDBANK LARBANK HUGBANKD D D D            
6 7 8MERGER LTCB FHCD D D        9 iAGE  10 , 11 ,i t i tLA DA      
 12 iSDROA  ,Ui t .     (4’) 
In these equations, the dependent variable is the measure of cost efficiency ,i tEF  (or its 
difference).  The key independent variable is 1tHI  , the market Hirfindahl representing 
market concentration, which is calculated using each bank’s nominal amount of loans 
outstanding.  Equation (4) (the level equation) focuses on the effect of  on the level of 
efficiency, and equation (4’) (the difference equation) focuses on its effect on the change in the 
efficiency level.  These equations are simultaneously estimated with equation (3) or (3’), 
respectively.  In either equation (4) or (4’), the quiet-life hypothesis predicts a negative 
coefficient for 
1tHI 
1 .   
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For control variables, we use several bank-specific characteristics.  Dummy variables 
, SMLBANKD MEDBANKD , , and LARBANKD HUGBANKD  respectively indicate that the relevant bank is a 
small, medium-sized, large, or huge bank.  The cut-offs for these size categories are 15 trillion 
yen, 40 trillion yen, and 65 trillion yen in nominal assets.  We use all four dummies, and do 
not include an intercept in equation (4) or (4’).  A dummy variable MERGERD  takes a value of 
unity if the relevant bank has ever experienced a merger before the relevant year.16  A dummy 
variable  takes a value of unity if the relevant bank is a long-term credit bank.  Another 
dummy variable  indicates that the bank is affiliated with a financial holding company.
LTCBD
DFHC 17  
Firm age is represented by .   iEAG
We also include some financial variables.  Two financial ratios are used to capture the 
difference in efficiency levels due to banks’ varying dependence on traditional deposit-to-loan 
business models:  is the ratio of total loans to total assets, and  is the ratio of total 
deposits to total assets.  To control for bank risk, we use , the standard deviation of 
ROA over the sample period.  
,i tLA ,i tDA
iSDROA
 
                                                  
16 More specifically, MERGERD
LTCBD
 takes a value of unity for Nippon Credit Bank, Mizuho Bank, Mizuho 
Corporate Bank, Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, Resona Bank, 
Asahi Bank, UFJ Bank, and Taiyo Kobe Bank, and  takes a value of unity for Industrial Bank 
of Japan, Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, Nippon Credit Bank, Shinsei Bank, and Aozora Bank.  
17 This variable takes a value of unity for Industrial Bank of Japan, Daiichi Kangyo Bank, Mizuho 
Bank, Fuji Bank, Mizuho Corporate Bank, Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi, Asahi Bank, Sanwa Bank, 
UFJ Bank, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, Daiwa Bank, and Resona Bank.  
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4.2.3.  Additional specification and estimation method 
In addition to the baseline specifications explained above, we estimate the equations by 
allowing for different impacts of the key independent variables for different time periods.  
Specifically, we add interaction terms between our key independent variables (i.e., , 1i tEF   in 
equation (3) or (3’) and  in equation (4) or (4’)) and three dummy variables, 
and , which respectively take the value of unity for the periods 1976-89, 
1990-2000, and 2001-2005.  The first period corresponds to the period when deregulation 
measures were taken and the famous “Japanese bubble” occurred.  The second period 
corresponds to the post-bubble period, which saw a serious economic slump and financial crisis.  
The third period is a period of recovery from that slump. 
1tHI 
7689 9000,D D 0105D
We simultaneously estimate the two equations (3) and (4), or (3’) and (4’), by Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM).  We deal with many potential problems in the estimation.  First, 
we explicitly control for heterosckedascity of the error term.  Second, we correct for serial 
correlation when it is found.  This is of particular importance because our panel data have 
large T (time period).  Third, we take into account endogeneity of some variables by using 
different instrumental variables for each equation.18  In ordinary approaches based on the 
                                                  
ln tGDP
,i tCR ln tGDP ,i tCR
18 In our two equations, neither of the two dependent variables enter in the other equation as an 
independent variable.  However, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that  and 
 in equation (3) (  and   in equation (3’)) and  and  in 
equation (4) (  and  in equation (4’)) are endogenous variables due to reverse 
,i tLA ,i tDA
,i tLA ,i tDA
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estimation of a stochastic frontier cost function where the inefficiency term follows a specific 
distribution, it is extremely difficult to cope with this endogeneity problem.19  Thus, our 
approach here has methodological advantages over the typical approach.    
 
4.3. Results  
4.3.1. Level equations 
The estimation results are shown in Table 2.  In this table, panel (A) reports the results for 
the simultaneous estimation of equations (3) and (4) (the level equations), while panel (B) 
reports those of equations (3’) and (4’) (the difference equations).  In each panel, column (i) 
shows the results for the baseline regression, and column (ii) shows those when we interact the 
key independent variables with the three period dummies and .  The test 
statistic for the overidentification restriction is far from significant (the p-value is 0.58).  
Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of overidentification.  This means that the 
likelihood that there is an error in the specification of the two equations is small.  The 
7689 9000,D D 0105D
                                                                                                                                                                
1ln tGDP trc , 1i tCR  t
causality.  For instrumental variables, we use the individual bank dummies for both equations, 
, , , INFL , 1i tEF,  , (or , , and  
when these interaction terms are used) for the ES equation, and 
7689
, 1i tEF D  9000, 1i tEF D  0105, 1i tEF D 
1tHI  , , SMLBANKD MEDBANKD
LARBANKD
, 
, MARGERD FHCD , 1i tLA  , 1i tDA, , ,   (or , , and ) for 
the quiet-life equation. 
7689
1tHI D  90001tHI D  01051tHI D 
19 One needs, for example, to specify the generating process of the endogenous variables as well as a 
joint distribution of the inefficiency term and other error terms.  The overall likelihood function is 
thus difficult to derive. 
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coefficients of interest are the coefficient on , 1i tEF   (in each subperiod) in the ES regression, 
and the coefficient on  (in each subperiod) in the quiet-life regression.  1tHI 
 
<<Insert Table 2 about here>> 
 
From column (i) of Panel (A), we see that the coefficient on , 1i tEF   is positive and 
significant.  This means that efficient banks become larger.  This finding lends support to the 
ES hypothesis.  As for the quiet-life hypothesis, we find that the coefficient for 1tHI   is 
negative and significant.  This finding is consistent with the prediction from the hypothesis 
that banks in a more concentrated market become more inefficient.   
Turning to column (ii), we find that the effect of , 1i tEF   on bank growth is always positive 
and significant even when we divide the sample period.  The impact is the largest in the middle 
of our three periods, and the smallest in the 2001-2005 period.  In the quiet-life equation, the 
hypothesis is supported in the 1990-2000 and the 2001-2005 periods, since  has a 
negative coefficient for 
1tHI 
, 1i tEF   in these periods.  We also find that the coefficient is the largest 
in the 1990s-2000 period, so the deterioration of efficiency due to market concentration is the 
highest in the 1990s.  The sign of the point estimate is opposite in the 1976-1989 period, but is 
statistically insignificant.   
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4.3.2. Difference equations 
The results for the difference equations (i.e., equations (3’) and (4’)) are shown in panel (B) 
of Table 2.  They are on balance similar to, and consistent with, those in panel (A).  In column 
(i), the ES hypothesis is supported, since the coefficient for , 1i tEF   is positive and statistically 
significant.  The coefficient for 1tHI   in the quiet-life equation is again negative and 
significant, so the quiet-life hypothesis is also supported.  In column (ii), we find that the main 
results are unchanged even if we allow for different impacts of the main independent variables 
in the three sub-sample periods.  The only difference between panel (A) and panel (B) is that 
the coefficient for  is now negative and significant.  76891tHI D 
We also find that the control variables generally have the anticipated impacts on the 
dependent variables, and that these effects are statistically significant.  The amount of loans 
(lnLi,t or ΔlnLi,t) is larger when loan demand is larger (larger GDP), or when loan supply is 
larger (a smaller interbank lending rate or a higher capital ratio (panel (A) only)).  Banks are 
more efficient when they are large (not huge), probably due to economies of scale.  
Post-merger banks are more efficient, probably because the merger enables them to cut costs; 
long-term credit banks are more efficient, probably because they are less dependent on deposit 
funding; and banks affiliated with a financial holding company are less efficient, probably 
because of their complex and hierarchical organizational structure.  We also find that younger 
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banks and less risky banks are more efficient, and banks with a higher loan to asset ratio or 
deposit to asset ratio are more efficient. 
 
4.3.3. Discussion 
On balance, our findings support both the ES hypothesis and the quiet-life hypothesis.  
These findings are robust to alternative measures of bank growth (i.e., levels or differences).  
Note that as discussed above, the two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive in theory, at least 
in the short run.  However, existing empirical studies did not allow for this possibility.  This 
paper is therefore the first study to find evidence supporting both hypotheses at once. 
Our findings are intriguing from an economic point of view.  The finding for the ES 
hypothesis implies that efficient banks grow more.  However, if the banking market becomes 
more concentrated due to the growth of such (efficient) banks, the finding for the quiet-life 
hypothesis then implies that the banks lose efficiency.  As they become inefficient, they then 
lose the size they had previously gained (the ES hypothesis).  Thus, our findings seem to imply 
the existence of an interesting cyclical dynamic of banks growth and decline, due to the 
interaction between size and efficiency. 
To further pursue this possibility, we calculate the economic impact of the two hypotheses.  
As for the ES hypothesis, when we focus on the results for the baseline specification in Table 2 
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(column (i) of panel A,), the point estimate for the coefficient for , 1i tEF   in the ES equation is 
1.643.  This indicates that for an average bank, an increase in the cost efficiency measure by 
one standard deviation (0.150) leads to an increase in  by 0.246, which is equivalent to a 
1.279-fold increase in .  The impact is therefore economically significant. 
,ln i tL
,i tL
The economic significance of the impact of the QL hypothesis can similarly be calculated.  
As shown in the same column in Table 2, the point estimate for the coefficient for  in the 
QL equation is -0.684.  Because the standard deviation of the Hirfindahl index for the 30-year 
period (1976-2005, N=30) is 0.074, an increase in the index by one standard deviation leads to 
a decrease in 
1tHI 
,i tEF  by 0.050.  Because the standard deviation of ,i tEF  is 0.150, we can 
conclude that the economic impact of the QL hypothesis is less significant than that of the ES 
hypothesis.  Although this comparison depends on different assumptions, it suggests that 
anti-concentration measures might increase inefficiency in the economy. 
 
4.4. Robustness check  
In this subsection, we check the robustness of our findings using yet another measure of 
bank growth.  Instead of focusing on bank growth in terms of loan size, we now focus on 
growth in terms of asset size.  In this check, we estimate the same equations ((3) and (4) or (3’) 
and (4’)) but replace  with ,i tL ,i tA , the size of banks’ assets.   
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 <<Insert Table 3 about here>> 
 
Table 3 shows the results when we focus on asset growth.  Again, panels (A) and (B) 
respectively report the results for the level equations (equations (3) and (4)) and for the 
difference equations (equations (3’) and (4’)), and in each panel columns (i) and (ii) are 
respectively for the specification without and with the interactions of the key independent 
variables with the period dummies.   
We can see that the results for the ES and the quiet-life hypotheses are robust to this 
alternative specification.  Compared with Table 2, the coefficients for the main independent 
variables ( , 1i tEF   and ) have the same signs and comparable significance levels, the only 
exception being the effect of 
1tHI 
, 1i tEF   on the asset growth during the 1990s.  On balance, 
irrespective of whether we measure bank growth by loan size or by asset size, both the ES 
hypothesis and the quiet-life hypothesis are supported.  This reinforces our conclusions in the 
previous section. 
 
5. Conclusion  
This paper proposes a new test of the efficient structure (ES) hypothesis by directly 
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examining the relationship between firm efficiency and firm growth.  It also tests the quiet-life 
hypothesis.  Applying this test to data on large banks in Japan, we consistently find that more 
efficient banks become larger, which is consistent with the efficient structure hypothesis.  We 
also find that market concentration erodes banks’ cost efficiency, which is consistent with the 
quiet-life hypothesis.  These findings imply that banks undergo an intriguing life-cycle 
dynamic: banks grow more as they become more efficient, but the resulting market 
concentration assures a “quiet life” for banks, which makes them lose efficiency and shrink.  
However, yet another finding suggest that the economic impact of the quiet life hypothesis is 
less significant than that of the ES hypothesis, implying that anti-concentration measures might 
increase inefficiency in the economy.   
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Appendix: Estimation of cost efficiency measure 
This appendix explains how we estimate the measure of cost efficiency.   
A.1. Equations 
A.1.1. Cost function and cost efficiency 
We estimate a translog cost function that takes the following form: 
 , , ,ln *Vi t V i tC p  * Bi t i
i
a D  , ,ln *YL L i ta y  , ,ln *YD D i ta y   
 , , , ,ln * *BLi i L i t V i t
i
a D p p       , , , ,ln * *BKi i K i t V i ti a D p p
       
 , , , ,ln * *BBi i B i t V i t
i
a D p p       
   2, ,1 2 ln *YLYL L i ta y      2, ,1 2 ln *YDYD D i ta y    
    2, , , ,1 2 ln * *LL L i t V i ta p p       2, , , ,1 2 ln * *KK K i t V i ta p p    
    2, , , ,1 2 ln * *BB B i t V i ta p p    
, , , ,ln * ln *YLYD L i t D i ta y y    , , , , , ,ln * ln * *YLL L i t L i t V i ta y p p    
 , , , , , ,ln * ln * *YLK L i t K i t V i ta y p p    , , , , , ,ln * ln * *YLB L i t B i t V i ta y p p    
, ,ln * *YLT L i t ta y     
 , , , , , ,ln * ln * *YDL D i t L i t V i ta y p p    , , , , , ,ln * ln * *YDK D i t K i t V i ta y p p    
 , , , , , ,ln * ln * *YDB D i t B i t V i ta y p p   , ,ln * *YDT D i t ta y     
   , , , , , , , ,ln * * ln * *LK L i t V i t K i t V i ta p p p p      , , , , , , , ,ln * * ln * *LB L i t V i t B i t V i ta p p p p    
 , , , ,ln * * *LT L i t V i t ta p p     
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   , , , , , , , ,ln * * ln * *KB K i t V i t B i t V i ta p p p p    , , , ,ln * * *KT K i t V i t ta p p     
 , , , ,ln * * *BT B i t V i t ta p p     
,i tv , 
 
where      2 3* * * *i t i iT t iTT t iTTT ta a a a a           represents the level of cost inefficiency, 
and the variables are defined as follows.  
 
- ,
V
i tC : Total (variable) costs = costs for current goods + labor costs + costs for physical 
capital goods + costs of financing by debts other than deposits. 
- , , *V i tp : price of current goods. 
- *t : time trend （= t – 1985）. 
- BiD : a dummy for individual bank (bank fixed-effect). 
- , , *L i ty : amount of real loans outstanding (= loans outstanding / GDP deflator). 
- , , *D i ty : amount of real deposits outstanding (= deposits outstanding / GDP deflator). 
- , , *L i tp : wage (= labor costs / amount of labor inputs). 
- , , *K i tp : price of physical capital goods. 
- , , *B i tp : interest rate (price) for debts other than deposits = (total financing costs – deposit 
interests) / (total liabilities – total deposits). 
- ,i tv : an ordinary error term. 
 
Variables marked with * are normalized by dividing them by their sample mean.  The data 
sources and more detailed definitions of the variables are explained below. 
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The assumption underlying this cost function is that banks produce loans using current 
goods (including advertisement and fringe-benefits), labor, physical capital (land, buildings, and 
movable assets), and debts other than deposits.  As no consensus has been reached regarding 
whether deposits are inputs or outputs, we do not make such an assumption a priori; instead we 
classify deposits as inputs or outputs based on the sign of the estimated partial derivative of the 
costs with respect to deposits.1  The cost function must be linearly homogeneous in factor prices.  
This is why we divide ,
V
i tC , , , *L i tp , , , *K i tp , , , *B i tp , and , , *L i tp  by , , *V i tp . 
After estimating this cost function, we calculate the measure of banks’ cost efficiency in the 
following manner.  We first calculate the measure of cost inefficiency that is defined by the ratio 
of actual costs to the cost on the efficient frontier. 
   , * min *i t i t i tiLIE a a   , 
where  min *i ti a   is the minimum of  *i ta   in year t.  Our measure of cost efficiency is 
defined as follows: 
       , ,exp exp min * *i t i t i t i tiEF LIE a a     . 
Schmidt and Sickles (1984) is the first study of efficiency estimation using fixed effects, and 
Kumbhakar (1989) was the first to use a flexible functional form like ours.  However, the 
estimations in these earlier studies are restrictive, because their estimates are not functions of 
time trends and so constant across time.  Cornwell et al. (1990) first estimate a time-varying 
efficiency measure.  The difference between their and our approaches is that the bank fixed 
effect ( ( )ia  ) is a quadratic function of time trend in their model, whereas it is a cubic function in 
our model.  
 
                                                 
1 This approach is justified by a characteristic of a variable cost function.  That is, the function is 
non-decreasing with respect to outputs, and non-increasing with respect to inputs.  See Chambers 
(1988) for more details. 
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A.1.2. Cost share equations 
To obtain efficient estimates, we estimate the above cost function together with the cost 
share equations, which are partial derivatives of the cost function with respect to 
 , , , ,ln * *L i t V i tp p ,  , , , ,ln * *K i t V i tp p , and  , , , ,ln * *B i t V i tp p .   
The cost share equations take the form: 
,
L
i tS BLi i
i
a D  , ,ln *YLL L i ta y  , ,ln *YDL D i ta y   , , , ,ln * *LL L i t V i ta p p   
 , , , ,ln * *LK K i t V i ta p p   , , , ,ln * *LB B i t V i ta p p  *LT ta   ,Li t , 
,
K
i tS BK i i
i
a D  , ,ln *YLK L i ta y  , ,ln *YDK D i ta y   , , , ,ln * *KK K i t V i ta p p   
 , , , ,ln * *LK L i t V i ta p p   , , , ,ln * *KB B i t V i ta p p  *KT ta   ,Ki t , 
,
B
i tS BBi i
i
a D  , ,ln *YLB L i ta y  , ,ln *YDB D i ta y   , , , ,ln * *BB B i t V i ta p p   
 , , , ,ln * *LB L i t V i ta p p   , , , ,ln * *KB K i t V i ta p p  *BT ta   ,Bi t , 
where ,
L
i tS  is the cost share of labor（=      , , , , , , , , , , , ,ln * ln * *L i t L i t i t i t V i t L i t V i tp x C C p p p    , 
where , ,L i tx  is labor input）and ,
L
i t  is the error term, ,Ki tS  is the cost share of capital goods（=
     , , , , , , , , , , , ,ln * ln * *K i t K i t i t i t V i t K i t V i tp x C C p p p    , where , ,K i tx  is capital input） and ,Ki t  
is the error term, and ,
B
i tS  is the cost share of debts other than deposits（=  , , , , ,B i t B i t i tp x C =
   , , , , , , ,ln * ln * *i t V i t B i t V i tC p p p  , where , ,B i tx  is the amount of debts other than deposits） 
and ,
B
i t  is the error term.   
 
A.2. Method of estimation 
We simultaneously estimate the cost function and the cost share equations by GMM.  In 
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this GMM estimation, we correct for conditional heteroscedascitity and serial correlation of the 
error terms.  We include a moving average of the error terms in the estimation of the 
orthogonality conditions of the variance-covariance matrix.  We follow Newey and West (1987) 
and use Bartrett’s spectral density kernel to assure that the estimate of the matrix is positive 
definite.  The order of the moving average is one.   
To improve the precision of estimation, we use different instrumental variables for each 
equation.  Specifically, the instrumental variables that we use are as follows: 
- Instruments for all the equations: BiD , , 1 , 1i t i tL A  , , 1 , 1i t i tD A  , , 1 , 1i t i tE A  , 
 , , 1 , 1 , 1ln *h i t i t i ty E A   （h = L, D）, 8790YD , and , , 1 8790ln * Yh i ty D  （h = L, D）, 
- Instruments for the cost function: *Bi tD  ,  2*Bi tD  ,  3*Bi tD  ,
 , , , ,ln * *Bi j i t V i tD p p ,   2, , , ,ln * *j i t V i tp p （j = L , K , B）, 
   , , , , , , , ,ln * * ln * *L i t V i t j i t V i tp p p p （j = K , B）, 
   , , , , , , , ,ln * * ln * *K i t V i t B i t V i tp p p p , and  , , , ,ln * * *j i t V i t tp p  （j = L, K, B）, 
, , 1ln *
B
i h i tD y  （h = L, D）,  2, , 1ln *h i ty  （h = L, D）,  , , 1 , , , ,ln * ln * *h i t j i t V i ty p p  （h 
= L, D ; j = L, K, B）, , , 1ln * *h i t ty   （h = L, D）, , , 1 , , 1ln * ln *L i t D i ty y  , 
 , 1 , 1 8790Yi t i tL A D   ,  , 1 , 1 8790Yi t i tD A D   , and  , 1 , 1 8790Yi t i tE A D   , and 
- Instruments for the (respective) cost share equations:  , , , ,ln * *j i t V i tp p （j = L, K, B） 
and , , 1ln *h i ty  （h= L, D）, 
where ,i tL  is the (nominal) amount of loans outstanding, ,i tA  is the (nominal) amount of 
financial assets, ,i tD  is the (nominal) amount of deposits outstanding, ,i tE  is the nominal 
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amount of equity capital, and 8790
YD  is a dummy variable for the bubble period (taking a value of 
one for 1987-1990). 
Because we use lagged variables as instrumental variables, the sample period for this 
estimation is from fiscal year 1975 to 2005 (starts on April 1975 and ends on March 2006).  Due 
to mergers, we have too few observations to estimate the parameters for some banks.  For these 
banks, we assume that the parameters Lia , K ia , Bia , and V ia  are the same between the new 
banks and their predecessors. 
 
A.3. Data and variable definitions 
This subsection explains how we use information from different sources to define the variables 
explained above.  Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for the variables are found in 
Table A1.  
 
<<Insert Table A1 about here>> 
 
A.3.1. Current goods 
First, we calculate the cost of current goods as Non-personnel expenses minus Depreciation 
and Rent of land, buildings, and machinery (source: banks’ balance sheets in Nikkei NEEDS 
CD-ROM (non-consolidated base)).  Second, we calculate the price of current goods, which is 
described below.  Finally, the amount of current goods is obtained as the cost of current goods 
divided by the price of current goods.   
To obtain the price of current goods, we divide current goods into three components: 
advertisement, fringe benefits, and other current goods.  The price of current goods is then 
defined as a bilateral price index of the price of these components, with the weights of these 
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prices being the ratio of the cost of each component to the total cost of current goods.2  
Formally, the price of current goods Vp  for bank i and year t, is defined as follows: 
 
 
, ,
, , ,
, ,
exp ln ln
2
VM VM
j i t j j j
V i t V t V
j A B C
w w
p p p

          , 
where ,
j
V tp （  , ,j A B C ）is the price of each component of the current goods (A: advertisement, 
B: fringe benefits, C: other current goods) which is defined below, ln jVp  is the sample mean of 
,ln
j
V tp , , ,
VM
j i tw ’s （  , ,j A B C ） are respectively the ratio of the cost of advertisement, the cost of 
fringe benefits, and the cost of other current goods to the cost of current goods, and VMjw  is the 
sample mean of , ,
VM
j i tw .   
The prices of the three components of the current goods ( ,
j
V tp ) are defined as follows.  
Firstly, the definition of the price of advertisement is:  
 
 , , , ,1
Advertising services price 1985 and after
exp ln before 1985
A
V t VA A
P j V j tj
p
w p
      6 　  
The best proxy for the price of advertisement is the advertising services price (from the 
Corporate Services Price Index of the Bank of Japan).  However, because this price is available 
only after 1985, we assume, for the period before 1985, that the price equals the weighted 
average of , ,ln
A
V j tp （ 1, ,6j   ）, or the natural logarithms of the prices of six “other current 
goods” (Personal service, Public service, Repairs & maintenance, Transportation & 
communication, Commodities (other manufacturing), Fuel, light & water charges) (source: the 
Consumer Price Index of the Statistical Bureau of Director-General for Policy Planning & 
Statistical Research and Training Institute, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
                                                 
2 Note that a ratio of any two of these indices is a multilateral index (see Caves, Laurits, and Diewert 
1982 and its application to banking in Fixler and Zieschang 1993). 
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Communications).  The weights ,
VA
P jw ’s are the ratios of the base-year weights for , ,
A
V j tp  
（ 1, ,6j   ） to their sum. 
Secondly, the price of fringe benefits is defined as a weighted average of the logarithm of the 
price for medical care ( ,1,
B
V tp ) and education ( ,2,
B
V tp ) (source: the Consumer Price Index of the 
Statistical Bureau of Director-General for Policy Planning & Statistical Research and Training 
Institute, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications).  Formally, 
2
, , , ,1
exp lnB VB BV t P j V j tjp w p    , 
where the weights ,
VB
P jw ’s are the ratios of the base-year weights for , ,
B
V j tp （ 1,2j  ） to their 
sum． 
Thirdly, the price of other current goods is defined as follows: 
 
 
12
, , , , , ,2 1
,
, , ,1
exp ln ln 1995 and after
exp ln before 1995
VA A VC C
P j V j t P j V j tj jC
V t
VA A
P j V j tj
w p w p
p
w p
 

           
 

6
6
　
 
where , ,
A
V j tp  and ,
VA
P jw （ 1, ,6j   ） are the same as those defined above.  , ,CV j tp ’s ( 1, ,12j   ） 
are the prices for Building maintenance services, Machinery repair, Transportation, 
Communication, Information services, Rent paid for real estate (offices), Rent paid for real 
estate (stores), Rent paid for real estate (parking lots), Leasing (computers), Leasing 
(communications equipment), Leasing (office equipment), Computer Rental (source: the 
Consumer Price Index of the Statistical Bureau of Director-General for Policy Planning & 
Statistical Research and Training Institute, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications).  The weights ,
VC
P jw ’s are the ratios of the base-year weights for , ,
C
V j tp
（ 1, ,12j   ） to the sum of the base-year weights, multiplied by the base-year weight of 
Individual services in the CPI ( ,1
VA
Pw ). 
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A.3.2. Labor 
As the cost of labor we use banks’ personnel expenses (source: banks’ balance sheets in 
Nikkei NEEDS CD-ROM (non-consolidated base)).  To calculate the amount of labor (labor 
input) , ,L i tx , we first calculate the amounts of male and of female labor , ,
j
L i tx  
(     male , femalej M F ）, derive their bilateral aggregation, and double it.3  More precisely, 
we define: 
 
, ,
, , , ,
,
2 exp ln
2
LM LM
j i t j j
L i t L i t
j M F
w w
x x

          , 
where  
, ,
j
L i tx = [the number of employees of gender j (source: Nikkei NEEDS CD-ROM)]×[the 
hours worked by gender (for gender j) in Finance and insurance industry (source: 
Monthly Labour Survey of the Ministry of Health, Labour and welfare)]×12/1000  
(     male , femalej M F ）,  
   , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,LM j j M M F Fj i t L i t L i t L i t L i t L i t L i tw p x p x p x      （  ,j M F ）, 
, ,
j
L i tp = the amount of salary in cash by gender (for gender j) in Finance and Insurance 
industry (source: Monthly Labour Survey of the Ministry of Health, Labour and 
welfare) 
LM
jw = the sample mean of , ,
LM
j i tw ．4 
                                                 
3 We double the aggregate because it represents a geometric average of male and female labor. 
4 We do not normalize , ,ln
j
L i tx  by its sample mean ln
j
Lx  , because , ,L i tp  is obtained by dividing 
the cost of labor by , ,L i tx , and so the price is qualitatively different from the bilateral price index 
(such as the price of current goods).  This definition also makes for an easier interpretation of the 
results.  
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Note that the number of employees by gender is not available after 1998.  We thus use for , ,
j
L i tx
the product of the number of total employees and the average ratio of the number of employees 
of gender j to that of total employees over the period up to 1998, because we find more variation 
in these variables across banks in the same year than across years for each bank.  Finally, the 
price of labor, or wage , ,L i tp , is defined as the cost of labor divided by the amount , ,L i tx . 
 
A.3.3. Capital goods 
We assume that capital goods are composed of two parts: Land and Buildings, and movable 
assets.  The cost of Land is a product of the amount of Land, , ,
L
K i tx  and its service price ,
L
K tp , 
while the cost of Buildings and movable assets is the product of its amount
 , ,
B
K i tx  and its service 
price , ,
B
K i tp .  Thus the cost of capital goods is , , , , , , , ,
K L L B B
i t K t K i t K i t K i tC p x p x    .  The amount 
(input) of capital goods , ,K i tx is then defined as ,
K
i tC  divided by , ,K i tp  (the price of capital goods 
as a whole).  Below, we explain how to calculate , , , , , , ,, , ,
L B L B
K i t K i t K t K i tx x p p  and , ,K i tp .  
We derive , ,
L
K i tx  and , ,
B
K i tx , in three steps.  First, we calculate (i) the nominal outstanding 
amount of Land, and of Buildings and movable assets.  Second, we calculate (ii) the real 
outstanding amount of Land, and of Buildings and movable assets, for the year when the data is 
first available, by deflating (i) for the year.  Finally, we calculate (iii) the real increase or 
decrease (i.e., difference) of Land, and of Buildings and movable assets in each year, by deflating 
the respective differences in (i).  Third, we obtain (iv) the real outstanding amount of Land, and 
of Buildings and movable assets, for the year after the data is first available, by successively 
adding (iii) in each year to (ii).  
For (i) Land, we use the book value of Primary land in possession (source: banks’ balance 
sheets in Nikkei NEEDS CD-ROM (non-consolidated base)) before 1997.  In 1997, we subtract 
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from this value the Revaluation difference, because from this year on the revaluation of Land by 
market prices was mandated by law (the Act on Revaluation of Land).  On the same ground, we 
further subtract Deferred tax liability from 1998 onward.5  For some banks data on Deferred tax 
liabilities are not available, and therefore we average the ratio of Deferred tax liabilities to 
Revaluation differences over several years prior to 1998, and multiply the ratio by Revaluation 
difference in 1998.  To calculate (i) for Buildings and movable assets, we subtract the book 
value of Primary land in possession from the book value of Land, buildings, and movable assets 
(source: banks’ balance sheets in Nikkei NEEDS CD-ROM (non-consolidated base)).  
To calculate (ii) and (iii), we use different deflators for Land and for Buildings and movable 
assets.  The deflator for Land is the Urban Land Price Index (Commercial urban land of 
nationwide) (source: Urban Land Price Index National Wooden House Market Index (Japan 
Real Estate Institute)).  The deflator for Buildings and movable assets is that for Gross Capital 
Formation (Private Non-Residential Investment) (source: SNA (Cabinet Office, the Government 
of Japan). 
Turning to the prices, we define ,
L
K tp  and , ,
B
K i tp  as: 
, ,
L L K
K t D t tp p r  , and 
, , 1
, , , ,
,
B B
B B K K D t D t
K i t D t t i t B
D t
p p
p p r d
p
      
, 
where ,
L
D tp  is the Urban Land Price Index (Commercial urban land nationwide) (source: Urban 
Land Price Index National Wooden House Market Index (Japan Real Estate Institute)), Ktr  is 
the yield on bank coupon debentures (5 years) (source: Financial and Economic Statistics 
Monthly from the Bank of Japan), ,
B
D tp  is the deflator for Gross Capital Formation (Private 
                                                 
5 If the resulting value was negative, we concluded that the book value was inaccurate, and thus 
corrected the book value by averaging the ratio of the book value to the revaluation difference and the 
deferred tax liability (for the years in which it takes a value greater than 1) and by multiplying it by 
the sum of the revaluation difference and the deferred tax liability.  
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Non-Residential Investment) (source: SNA from the Cabinet Office, Government of Japan), and 
,
K
i td  is the rate of depreciation (= depreciation (source: Nikkei NEEDS CD-ROM) / , ,
B
K i tx ).6   
Finally, similar to the case of current goods, we define , ,K i tp , the price of capital goods (as a 
whole), as a bilateral index of ,
L
K tp  and , ,
B
K i tp .  More specifically, 
   , , , ,, , , , ,exp ln ln ln ln2 2KM KM KM KML i t L L L B i t B B BK i t K t K K i t Kw w w wp p p p p                    , 
where the weights , ,
KM
j i tw （  ,j L B ） are defined as 
   , , , , , , , , , , , ,KM L L L L B BL i t K t K i t K t K i t K i t K i tw p x p x p x      and 
   , , , , , , , , , , , , ,KM B B L L B BB i t K i t K i t K t K i t K i t K i tw p x p x p x     , 
KM
jw （  ,j L B ）  are the sample means of , ,KMj i tw （  ,j L B ） , and ln LKp  and ln BKp  are 
respectively the sample means of ,ln
L
K tp  and , ,ln
B
K i tp . 
 
A.4. Results 
 
<<Insert Table A2 about here>> 
<<Insert Table A3 about here>> 
 
Table A2 reports the regression results for the stochastic frontier cost function.  The 
estimates of Lia , Kia , Bia , Via （i= 1,2,4,6,8-10,12,13,15-17,19,21,23-27） are not shown in the 
table.  Instead, the estimates of VVa , YLVa , YDVa , LVa , KVa , BVa , and VTa  are shown, which 
                                                 
6 We do not take into account depreciation and capital gains in calculating ,
L
K tp .  This is because 
depreciation for land is zero, and because capital gains in the bubble period (1987-1990) are so huge 
that taking them into account makes the service price of land negative. 
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are calculated from the condition of linear homogeneity with respect to factor prices (i.e., 
2 2 2VV LL KK BB LK LB KBa a a a a a a         ,  YLV YLL YLK YLBa a a a    , 
 YDV YDL YDK YDBa a a a    ,  LV LL LK LBa a a a    ,  KV LK KK KBa a a a    , 
 BV LB KB BBa a a a    ,  VT LT KT BTa a a a    ).  The estimates of cost efficiency for 
individual banks that are obtained from the regression results are shown in Table A3. 
 
Definition Source # of obs. Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Real loans outstanding = loans outstanding / GDP
deflator (million yen) (a), (b) 384 16,039,100 10,597,000 2,559,613 56,489,700
Cost effiicency measure Our calculation(see Appendix) 384 0.772 0.150 0.424 1.000
Real GDP (b) 384 392,717 88,959 247,834 548,249
Call rate (interbank rate) (collateralized rate before
1986 and uncollateralized rate afterwards) (c) 384 0.029 0.014 0.007 0.127
Regulatory capital ratio (if unavailable, capital/assets) (a) 384 0.035 0.029 0.007 0.142
Inflation rate (the rate of change in GDP deflator) (b) 384 0.017 0.024 -0.03 0.078
Hirfindahl index (market concentration measure) (a) 384 0.087 0.04 0.071 0.424
Small bank dummy (= 1 if total assets < 15 trillion yen) (a) 384 0.346 0.476 (NA) (NA)
Medium bank dummy (= 1 if 15 trillion yen =< total
assets < 40 trillion yen) (a) 384 0.391 0.489
(NA) (NA)
Large bank dummy (= 1 if 40 trillion yen =< total
assets < 65 trillion yen) (a) 384 0.224 0.417
(NA) (NA)
Huge bank dummy  (= 1 if total assets >= 65 trillion
yen) (a) 384 0.039 0.194
(NA) (NA)
Merger dummy (= 1 if the bank experienced a merger)
Hand collected
(different
sources)
384 0.094 0.292 (NA) (NA)
LTCB dummy (= 1 if the bank is a long-term credit
bank)
Hand collected
(different
sources)
384 0.201 0.401 (NA) (NA)
Holding company dummy (= 1 if the bank is affiliated
with a financial holding company)
Hand collected
(different
sources)
384 0.057 0.233 (NA) (NA)
Bank age
Hand collected
(different
sources)
384 65.479 28.111 3.083 104.833
Loans/assets (a) 384 0.568 0.072 0.330 0.732
Deposits/assets (a) 384 0.581 0.197 0.132 0.794
Standard deviation of ROA (ROA= (total interest
income - total interest expenses - ordinary
costs)/assets䠅
(a) 384 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.003
Table 1䚷Descriptive statistics for simultaneous estimation
Variables
Efficiency Hypothesis
regression
Quiet-life Hypothesis
regression
Data sources: (a) Nikkei NEEDS CD-ROM, (b) SNA of the Cabinet Office, (c) Financial and economic statistics monthly of the Bank of Japan.
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# of obs. Mean Std Dev. Min. Max.
 (million yen) 410 15,957,200 10,904,800 2,531,535 56,489,700
 (million yen) 410 16,629,700 13,287,300 971,360 70,883,200
410 0.04 0.017 0.003 0.079
410 1.031 0.166 0.629 1.221
410 3.848 1.275 1.689 8.415
410 1.072 0.247 0.355 1.762
 (million yen) 410 569,638 403,874 42,873 2,064,571
Share of cost for ordinary goods 410 0.123 0.085 0.011 0.47
410 0.214 0.122 0.024 0.528
410 0.05 0.028 0.005 0.162
410 0.614 0.21 0.1 0.956
Table A1䚷Descriptive statistics for variables in cost function estimation
, ,L i ty
, ,D i ty
, ,B i tp
, ,V i tp
, ,L i tp
, ,K i tp
,
V
i tC
,
L
i tS
,
K
i tS
,
B
i tS
Coef. Estimates St. Error t P
             1.3300              0.0727            18.2903 0.000
            -0.3148              0.0483             -6.5193 0.000
             0.7368              0.0944              7.8031 0.000
            -0.1247              0.0477             -2.6163 0.009
             0.0883              0.0090              9.8355 0.000
             0.0272              0.0016            17.4921 0.000
             0.2313              0.0044            51.9804 0.000
             0.1055              0.0120              8.8087 0.000
            -0.1572              0.0530             -2.9656 0.003
            -0.0841              0.0058           -14.6016 0.000
            -0.0082              0.0020             -4.1899 0.000
             0.1489              0.0075            19.7364 0.000
            -0.0566              0.0048           -11.7741 0.000
             0.0008              0.0046              0.1694 0.865
            -0.0211              0.0068             -3.1051 0.002
            -0.0059              0.0018             -3.3630 0.001
             0.0097              0.0086              1.1282 0.259
             0.0173              0.0057              3.0573 0.002
             0.0003              0.0034              0.0794 0.937
             0.0117              0.0030              3.8678 0.000
            -0.1084              0.0029           -37.4694 0.000
             0.0085              0.0095              0.8857 0.376
            -0.0050              0.0004           -12.8595 0.000
            -0.0239              0.0008           -28.8756 0.000
            -0.0150              0.0033             -4.5908 0.000
            -0.0007              0.0001             -5.2919 0.000
            -0.0989              0.0028           -35.3000 0.000
             0.0053              0.0005            10.3655 0.000
             0.0004              0.0004              1.1608 0.246
Bank fixed effects yes
Value function
Obs.
Table A2  Regression result for stochastic frontier cost function
Cost function 0.989705
Share of labor 0.917889
Share of capital 0.827383R
2
410
Share of nondeposit debts 0.940428
0.348222
Overidentifiaction
test
[P value]
142.771
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